Hi Saphire, Very easy for you to say without concrete examples. I can try to post case examples for you as available and permission is granted. I have a significant portfolio of such cases... but I do need to get permission, and then put them in a postable format. May take me a bit, but I *WILL* do it... had been on my list anyway. So assuming I am trading up in value and will be financing 80% (because no one will give me the house at 100% and I do not have enough cash to buy it outright) Do you mean no bank will LEND 100% on that house? Be aware, you ARE financing 100% of the purchase. Apparently you'll be taking 80% from the bank at the cost of their interest charges, and 20% from your family at the cost of the safe returns available. There's no free lunch... ALL of the money comes at a cost, including the money you take away from your family's safety reserves and growth investments. if I buy an expensive house (for me) you are right that this affects my portfolio as a whole so how do I get the least expensive rate or product that also is nbot subject to rate increases if the market changes Fortunately for you, right now the expense premium on longterm fixed loans is very small above the more timeframe realistic 5 and 7 year fixed intermediary programs. You can likely get the risks completely bank-carried at just 1/4% or so above the 5 year terms. I'd suggest being a little 'suspicious' of ol' Mr. Market, however... when Mr. Market makes longterm fixed loan costs extremely attractive relative to shorter term periods, the Market knows that the shorter term programs are more likely to become significantly cheaper as they adjust (thus the "market trickery" to entice the consumer into the more expensive programs permanently.) Without concrete examples or references, either as to stradegies that work or references to formulas or analysis it all sounds very ambigious, mysterious and a bit glib. It certainly takes an open mind for numbers, and the ability to visualize offsetting growth or cost curves. The bases of the entire conceptual issue are; Rates are relative; When costs of borrowing increase, yields on savings/investments increase, and vice versa. Cash Is King; The costs of being illiquid in emergency can be catastrophically worse than the costs of staying liquid (in carrying costs on the leverage to do so,) It is very easy to say a FMR is expensive but without providing either alternatives or examples or references as to why that is so, I have to question it Currently the immediate face costs on a 30 FRM versus (as example) a 5 yr ARM are minimal... very financially unusual, which DOES definitely call for suspicion. The more obscure costs on a Fixed are the ongoing higher carry costs incurred when rates shift to the downside on the loan, but you are stuck at the higher rates unless/until you incur another round of transaction costs to reset the financing. Eliminating uncertainty is more efficiently done by matching income yield instruments (savings & investments) to leverage instruments (mortgages.) Properly placed and managed the spread continually works in your favor, and you remain much safer as you are not locked away from your liquidity. CLEARLY explain how this works or various stragies that might work for a trade up house that is intended to be held indefinitely How long you intend to OWN is irrelevant, (what DOES matter is how long you intend to take to reach financial independence,) but I do have a few cases that reflect the same situation. I'll see if I can get them illustrated to present as soon as feasible. Cheers, Dave Donhoff Strategic Equity & Mortgage Planner

Couldn't you just upload it as a google doc, then post a link and everybody could have access it without emailing individually?

The company being investigated allegedly mimicks Hope Now, an established non-profit foreclosure prevention counseling organization. Here is a link that might be useful: Attorney-General Investigating Mortgage Co.

Fannie and Freddie are apparently not blameless "victims" of their own supposed ignorance of what they were doing after all..as some prefer to believe... IF this pans out as true....(time will tell what under the table deals may come about nonetheless)... Of course. These two guys probably have three times that if not more squirreled away in some tax favorable or exempt off shore accounts ..... HALLELUJAH!!!!! Regulator Plans to Bar Big Severance By JAMES R. HAGERTY September 15, 2008; Page A18 The regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac said Sunday that it won't allow the companies to make "golden parachute" severance payments to the mortgage companies' ousted chief executive officers. In a statement, the Federal Housing Finance Agency said such payments wouldn't be made to Daniel Mudd and Richard Syron, despite provisions in their contracts. Mr. Mudd served as chief executive of Fannie and Mr. Syron was chairman and CEO of Freddie until last weekend, when the regulator seized control of the companies, saying they were in danger of running out of capital. News reports that the two executives stood to receive millions of dollars in severance payments under their contracts triggered public protests from numerous politicians and inspired political cartoons in newspapers. The FHFA cited "applicable statute and regulation" for its decision. The regulator has taken management control of the two companies under a legal process known as "conservatorship," which could last for years while Fannie and Freddie are restored to financial health. The U.S. Treasury has pledged to provide as much capital as the companies need to continue in their role as the main suppliers of funding for home mortgages. The FHFA last week named Herb Allison as CEO at Fannie and David Moffett as CEO at Freddie. Spokesmen for Fannie and Freddie declined to comment on the pay decision. Messrs. Syron and Mudd couldn't be reached immediately for comment. David Schmidt, a senior consultant at James F. Reda & Associates LLC, a compensation consulting concern in New York, estimated that, without the regulator's intervention, Mr. Mudd's exit package could total as much as $6 million to $8 million and Mr. Syron's $15 million. Those totals include pensions, continuing benefits and other payments the companies' boards might grant. It isn't clear what pension and other payments may still be made to Messrs. Syron and Mudd, given the regulator's ruling. The collapse in the share prices of Fannie and Freddie already has wiped out much of the two executives' wealth. Since March, for instance, the value of Mr. Mudd's shares in Fannie has dropped to about $683,000 from $23.7 million.