Hi Scottfsmith Good that you said you are not sure what i am looking for. Sorry if i wrote it little hard way it. I have found shop which sell peaches. Red heaven was variety as i said earlier. So i started to look information about peach varieties. We here Finland do not have a lot of peach varieties available, i think this is quite new thing this Peach growing here. I have found shop in Italy which sells peach trees. In it internet site it says any plant anywhere on title and registration page has place to choose country. So i think they might ship it to here. On that site i saw peach varieties. Glohaven, Redhaven, Cardinal, Babygold 6, Springcrest, Springtime varieties was listed which are from U.S.A. (Many of them). Those varieties which i posted describtions above. So i did to search peach variety describtions english and then also italy language, which i translated to english using Google translate. I tried to get information about them, where they grow, how hardy they are, what they taste, when they bloom, oh and yes maturity timeline. Not much information available from mine country, but something. I asked some way does someone have own growing experiences. I have seen some post here about people growing peaches, i remember your old variety post, one people from Colorado asking peach varieties, i think she onemilehighgirl, sorry if i wrote id wrong (I think that came from woman) has Cresthaven peach and also that North Dakota people having peaches, altought he, Troman1973 id if i do not remember wrong last time i remember thought moving into blueberries. I found it hard to find some variety describtion on internet, especially Cardinal. Frost is little easier, but some hard finding there too. Cardinal variety From Georgia U.S.A. if i remember right. But found this on it : Cardinal medium fruit with bright red over yellow skin; flesh is yellow, firm with a melting texture; freestone from Georgia. Early midseason harvest. Springtime is white flesh peach. As i said i haven't tasted white flesh peach so i asked what is taste like. I have found now on internet they are sweet. Yellow flesh are more acidic. Can you tell me what "acidic" exactly mean? Is that same kind of flavor than red currants? Sour, no i think. What kind of acidicidy they are referring? Here is some peach variety describtions : http://www.harvestwizard.com/2007/06/peach_varieties_there_are_more.html I looked that Italy site, because they have more peach varieties, which are not available (I think so) here. Springtime, Springcrest varieties seems to be earlier than Red haven. I think it might cost more to buy trees from Italy, but if there is some good peach varieties it might be worth a try. Other choice would be just stay here and buy peach here. What you think about Peach hardiness? I have seen USDA zones and chilling units on internet. I have read that post on peaches here in Gardenweb, i think it make sense many ways. I have feeling that it is important peach to have enough time to ripens fruits and hardening to winter. As that post says hardiness is more than zone. Springcrest has 650 chilling units requirement and i have seen it to grow on the following places : Alto, Georgia, U.S.A (Ripens 5.6.-12.6. when i wrote that down, but looks like this information is no longer available.) . Brentwood, California, U.S.A. Also saw picture from Australia. This variety is for sell in New Zealand. I found Springcrest also to be in recommendations list in Georgia peach and nectarines for home use in different Georgia zones. Zones 4 and 5 says page, which is southern Georgia, U.S.A. for example Tifton, Geogia U.S.A. Here is the link : http://pubs.caes.uga.edu/caespubs/pubcd/C741-W.HTMl Cresthaven was for zone 1,2,3 on the list. So looks like things are not as simply. Above i mentioned just that there is many things to consider, if you have something lack, maybe you can justify it by another thing. What firmness means in peaches? http://www.caes.uga.edu/commodities/fruits/gapeach/varieties.html Says Springcrest is high firmness. I think it means peach do not go soft and holds it's form good way. Did i got it right? Correction to mine message, i wrote New Zealand has opposite season (Altought i do not see at this moment orginal message.), i meant opposite season compared northern hemishphere. New Zealand is located in southern hermishphere. Thanks of book name but i looked in it google and you seemed to be quite right about that it is hard to find. Eskota hi Thanks of book name. I looked little bit in it and found 1 peach variety describtion.

tox, It's a good point, but target plant selectivity is a hallmark of herbicide development. What everyone wants is high effectiveness with only the target plant, and no effect on the crop being protected. For clopyralid, as an example, forage and grass hays are permitted a residual level of 500 ppm. We know that tomatoes are sensitive to levels of 30 ppb in the soil. If you couple that kind of effective selectivity with some environemtal persistence, then the stage gets set for someone, somewhere to have an issue. edit - To illustrate the point -- if the half life for degradation were 30 days (about the average for clopyralid), and the soil level were 10 ppm, then by my calculation it would take ~9 months for that 10 ppm to decay to a level of While farmers did use to love the persistent aspect, many are now questioning the desirability because of how their options can get cut when faced with a need for crop rotation. That hit ND wheat farmers when scab became an issue. I have heard anecdotally that WI dairy farmers in some areas are now prohibited from exporting their manures off-farm, and many are running out of places to keep the stuff. My suspicion is that market forces in the ag world may set a new direction before EPA and registration become a major issue. This post was edited by TXEB on Thu, May 2, 13 at 12:44

If you do use REVO to uninstall give a thought to running CCleaner's registry tool after as a check for remaining orphan entries. Be sure to only select items associated with Adobe Reader, and accept the backup offer. No guessing. AR is large, configures deeply into the system, and is a resource hog. Prior to REVO it was a pain to uninstall. If not XCV, Foxit Reader is a viable alternative. DA

I got this from a newsletter which I highly recommend written by John Mauldin although I just read it for curiousity not investment advice It seems to illustrate Bear Sterns is just the begining and if interest rates go up more we will be in a pickle. Altough he seems to indicate at the end that interest rates will eventually go down in response to a slow down This Week in Outside the Box we Join Bill Gross of Pimco in his July 2007 Investment Outlook as he strives to address the implications of the Bear Stearns hedge fund debacle, the toxic waste that is Wall Streets' innovative derivative products and their respective valuation, rather, lack thereof. If Dear reader you have not been party to the excess of the Wall Street you may have not heard of the two Bear Stearns hedge Funds focusing on the subprime market that were subsequently liquidated on account of their inability to meet margin calls, thus wiping out investors. Mr. Gross believes that while significant, we ought not to look to Wall Street to see the repercussions of our excess but to the heart lands of America and the real estate there financed via subprime loans to witness the true folly of our capitalist ways. John Mauldin, Editor Looking for Contagion in All the Wrong Places Investment Outlook Bill Gross : July 2007 Whew, that was a close one! Ugly for a few days I guess, but it could have been much worse! No, I refer not to Paris Hilton upon her initial release from the LA County pokey after serving three days of hard time, but to the Bear Stearns/subprime crisis. Shame on you Mr. Stearns, or whoever you were, for scaring us investors like that and moving the Blackstone IPO to the second page of the WSJ. We should have had a week of revelry and celebration of levered risk taking. Instead you forced us to remember Long Term Capital Management and acknowledge once again (although infrequently) that genius, when combined with borrowed money, can fail. But (as the Street would have you believe), this was just a close one. Sure Bear itself had to come up with a $3 billion bailout, but folks, most of these assets are worth 100 cents on the dollar. At least that's how they have 'em marked! Didn't wanna sell any so that someone would think otherwise...no need to yell "fire" in a crowded theater 'ya know. After all, hasn't Ben Bernanke repeated in endless drones that financial derivatives are a healthy influence on the financial markets and the economy? And aren't these assets well...financial derivatives? Besides, I direct you to the investment grade, nay, in many cases AAA ratings of these RMBS (Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities) and CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations) and defy you to tell me that these architects were not prudent men. (Sorry ladies, they are still mostly men!) Well prudence and rating agency standards change with the times, I suppose. What was chaste and AAA years ago may no longer be the case today. Our prim remembrance of Gidget going to Hawaii and hanging out with the beach boys seems to have been replaced in this case with an image of Heidi Fleiss setting up a floating brothel in Beverly Hills. AAA? You were wooed Mr. Moody's and Mr. Poor's by the makeup, those six-inch hooker heels, and a "tramp stamp." Many of these good looking girls are not high-class assets worth 100 cents on the dollar. And sorry Ben, but derivatives are a two-edged sword. Yes, they diversify risk and direct it away from the banking system into the eventual hands of unknown buyers, but they multiply leverage like the Andromeda strain. When interest rates go up, the Petri dish turns from a benign experiment in financial engineering to a destructive virus because the cost of that leverage ultimately reduces the price of assets. Houses anyone? Oh, I kid the Fed Chairman - and I should stop because this is no laughing matter, and somehow I have a suspicion that this "close one," this Paris Hilton charade of a crisis, is really so much more than just a 3 or 27 day lockup in the LA County jail. Those that point to a crisis averted and a return to normalcy are really looking for contagion in all the wrong places. Because the problem lies not in a Bear Stearns hedge fund that can be papered over with 100 cents on the dollar marks. The flaw resides in the Summerlin suburbs of Las Vegas, Nevada, in the extended city limits of Chicago headed west towards Rockford, and yes, the naked (and empty) rows of multistoried condos in Miami, Florida. The flaw, dear readers, lies in the homes that were financed with cheap and in some cases gratuitous money in 2004, 2005, and 2006. Because while the Bear hedge funds are now primarily history, those millions and millions of homes are not. They're not going anywhere...except for their mortgages that is. Mortgage payments are going up, up, and up...and so are delinquencies and defaults. A recent research piece by Bank of America estimates that approximately $500 billion of adjustable rate mortgages are scheduled to reset skyward in 2007 by an average of over 200 basis points. 2008 holds even more surprises with nearly $700 billion ARMS subject to reset, nearly ¾ of which are subprimes. It was not supposed to be this way. 1% teasers or 3% 2/28's were supposed to be rolled with no points into something resembling...well...1% teasers and 3% 2/28's. Instead today we have nearly 7% fixed rate mortgages and not a teaser to be found. Congress, regulators, even Fed officials are stepping in and warning mortgage originators (even mortgage buyers!) that they'd better be careful and only make good loans. Those nasty capitalists! They must have gotten carried away a few years ago. Somehow all those BMWs in the New Century parking lot in Irvine, California didn't attract much notice in 2006. Now, well, there's nary a Prius to be found there, but lots of outraged politicians in Washington, that's for sure. The right places to look for contagion are therefore not in the white-washed Bear Stearns hedge funds, but in the subprime resets to come and the ultimate effect they will have on the prices of homes - the collateral that's so critical in this asset-backed, and therefore interest-sensitive financed-based economy of 2007 and beyond. If delinquencies lead to defaults and then to lower home prices, then we have problems and the potential for an extended - not a 27-day Paris Hilton sentence. Take a look at Chart 1, which graphically points out the deterioration in subprime ARM delinquencies. Escalating delinquencies of course ultimately lead to escalating defaults. Currently 7% of subprime loans are in default. The percentage will grow and grow like a weed in your backyard tomato patch. Now I, the curmudgeon of credit, am as sure of this as I am that the sun will set in the west. The uncertain part is by how much. But look at it this way: using the current default rate of 7% (3-4% total losses), the holders of some BBB investment grade subprime-based CDOs will lose all of their moolah because of the significant leverage. No need to worry about fictitious 100 cents on the dollar marks here. One hundred percent of nothing equals nothing. If subprime total losses hit 10% then even some single-A tranches face the grim reaper. AAA's? Folks the point is that there are hundreds of billions of dollars of this toxic waste and whether or not they're in CDOs or Bear Stearns hedge funds matters only to the extent of the timing of the unwind. To death and taxes you can add this to your list of inevitabilities: the subprime crisis is not an isolated event and it won't be contained by a few days of headlines in The New York Times. And it will not remain confined to a neat little Petri dish in some mad financial derivative scientist's laboratory. Ultimately through capital market arbitrage it will affect risk spreads in markets completely divorced from U.S. housing. What has the Brazilian Real to do with U.S. subprimes? Nothing except many of the same bets are held in hedge funds that by prudence or necessity will reduce their risk budgets to stay afloat. And the U.S. economy? Of course it will be affected. Consumption will be reduced to say nothing of new home construction over the next 12-18 months. After all, attractive subprime pricing has been key to the housing market's success in recent years. Now that has disappeared. Importantly, as well, and this point is neglected by most pundits, the willingness to extend credit in other areas - high yield, bank loans, and even certain segments of the AAA asset-backed commercial paper market should feel the cooling Arctic winds of a liquidity constriction. If not taken too far - and there is no hint yet of a true "crisis" - these developments may be just what the Fed has been looking for: easy credit becoming less easy; excessive liquidity returning to more rational levels. Still, PIMCO looks for the Fed to issue an insurance policy in the form of lower Fed Funds at some point over the next 6 months. And what happened to our glass half-full secular thesis of last month? We still believe in strong global growth, but...as we also suggested...that the U.S. housing downturn will affect growth and short-term yields over the next year or so. We remain consistent and resolute. Contagion? Maybe, but you won't be finding it at "99.9%" pure Bear Stearns. Look for it instead, in the subprimely financed homes of Las Vegas, Rockford, Illinois, and Miami, Florida. This problem - aided and abetted by Wall Street - ultimately resides in America's heartland, with millions and millions of overpriced homes and asset-backed collateral with a different address - Main Street. William H. Gross Managing Director